The belief that war was unavoidable helped drive the catastrophe of the First World War, and the German historian Gerd Krumeich argues that Europe should remember that lesson today. In an article published by Die Welt, Krumeich compares the situation in 1914 with the situation in 2026 and voices concern about the current strategic position of the continent.
Krumeich's central point is that the conviction that a conflict could not be avoided shaped decisions in the summer of 1914 and pushed the powers of Europe towards a war that few of them had wanted in its full scale. The fatalism of that moment narrowed the space for negotiation at precisely the time when alternatives still existed. By drawing lessons from the errors of that year, he suggests that contemporary policymakers should be wary of repeating the same mental pattern, in which escalation is treated as a given rather than as a choice.
The historian applies these lessons to the relationship between NATO and Russia under President Vladimir Putin. He frames the question of how the alliance should face Moscow as a matter of political judgement rather than of military inevitability. The notes available for this report indicate that Krumeich addresses this question directly, but the specific recommendations he makes are not set out in the material on which this account is based, so they cannot be reproduced in detail here.
The comparison between the two periods rests on the idea that historical memory can inform present choices. Krumeich's framing places the emphasis not on predicting a particular military outcome but on the political mindset that allows escalation to appear unavoidable. In his reading, that mindset is itself a risk factor, because it erodes the room for diplomacy, for deliberate restraint and for keeping channels of communication open even under pressure.
Krumeich's warning also touches on how governments explain their decisions to the public. When leaders describe a path as the only possible one, they limit the debate in advance and make later reversals harder to justify. The historian's reference to 1914 invites readers to consider how easily a sense of necessity can take hold once a crisis has begun to move quickly.
The article is brief, and only its summary and subtitle are available in the material used for this report, so the full range of Krumeich's arguments and any further evidence he offers should be read in that context. What the reporting makes clear is that a leading German historian sees in 1914 a warning for 2026, and that he considers the belief in an unavoidable war the dangerous element to be resisted.