A nonpublic Russian government document approved in September 2024 lays out a sweeping plan to deepen cooperation with Iran across finance, nuclear energy, aviation, and transportation through the end of 2026, according to a review of the 44-page Russian-language roadmap.
The document, titled «Plan for Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran for 2024-2026» and marked «For official use,» assigns ministries, agencies, and state companies responsibility for specific projects with deadlines extending through 2026. It was approved on the Russian side on Sept. 2, 2024, predating the current war involving Iran and the United States by more than a year.
Keti Korkiya, a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Russia Program, reviewed the document and said its significance lies less in any single project than in the architecture Moscow is trying to build around the relationship.
«The roadmap is not revelatory: people paying close attention to the relationship between Russia and Iran will see many collaborations between the two countries that have been public for years,» Korkiya said in written analysis. «What is more revealing is the architecture of the relationship Moscow is trying to build,» she added, pointing to financial mechanisms, transportation routes, energy investment, and aviation cooperation as different ways of reducing vulnerabilities created by sanctions and Western economic pressure.
A European intelligence source who reviewed the material described the documents as nonpublic, high-level, and illustrating comprehensive cooperation between Russia and Iran. «It is also strategic, sensitive and highly politicized, focusing on areas like nuclear programs, energy trade and financial transactions that aim to evade the U.S. sanctions,» the source said.
A U.S. official, responding on background, said U.S. sanctions have «severely isolated Russia and Iran from the international financial system,» adding that efforts by the two countries to develop alternative financial channels and other sanctions-evasion schemes were therefore «not surprising.» The official said Washington closely tracks attempts by sanctioned jurisdictions to develop alternative cross-border payment mechanisms and would seek to disrupt those that facilitate sanctions evasion or illicit finance.
The Russian document itself does not use the phrase «sanctions evasion.» Instead, it repeatedly calls for increased use of national currencies, independent financial channels, and measures to counter what Moscow describes as «unilateral restrictive measures.»
Some of the clearest provisions concern how Russia and Iran intended to move money. The plan set a target of increasing the share of bilateral trade conducted in national currencies from 68% in 2024 to 71% by 2026, while also seeking to expand correspondent accounts denominated in national currencies. More ambitiously, the roadmap calls for the Bank of Russia and the Central Bank of Iran to develop the use of central bank digital currencies for cross-border settlements.
Another provision calls for «ensuring the use of independent systems for transmitting financial messages,» including connecting financial institutions to independent channels for exchanging financial information. The document does not identify which messaging system would be used or explicitly state that the goal was to bypass SWIFT or U.S. financial controls.
Some of that financial integration later became public. In February 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said Russia and Iran had «practically completely» shifted bilateral settlements into national currencies using their own systems for transmitting financial and banking messages. Interfax reported that the effort was part of a broader push toward independent payment infrastructure between the two countries.
Iran's ambassador to Russia also said in February 2025 that Tehran and Moscow no longer needed SWIFT for bilateral banking relations and were using their own confidential bank-messaging systems. He said the initial phase of linking Iran's Shetab payment network with Russia's Mir system had begun the previous year.
Korkiya said the significance of those measures is cumulative. «Individually, none of these initiatives is transformative,» she wrote. «Collectively, however, they amount to an attempt to remove single points of vulnerability and build redundancy into the Russia-Iran economic relationship.»
The financial effort is paired with a political one. The roadmap calls for Russia and Iran to coordinate positions on international issues and to work together in multilateral organizations, according to the document. It also outlines cooperation on nuclear energy, including plans for Russian participation in the construction of new nuclear power units in Iran, and on aviation, with provisions for Iranian production of components for Russian aircraft.
The document further describes major energy projects and new transportation routes stretching toward the Persian Gulf, part of a broader effort to create alternative trade corridors that reduce reliance on Western-controlled routes.
Because the roadmap predates the current conflict involving Iran and the United States, it does not establish which projects remain active or how the war may have altered Moscow's plans. But an independent review of the Russian-language document, along with subsequent public reporting, shows that a number of initiatives described in the roadmap later advanced or materialized.