A Justice Department inspector general audit has concluded that ubiquitous technical surveillance, or UTS, continues to threaten the department and that its components are ill-prepared to counter it, leaving employees, investigations, sources, and witnesses at increased risk. The finding, released in an updated audit last week, follows a June 2025 report detailing how a hacker working for the Sinaloa cartel used an FBI assistant legal attaché's phone number to obtain call records and location data, then tapped Mexico City's camera network to follow the official and identify contacts. The cartel used that information to intimidate potential sources and cooperating witnesses and, in some cases, to kill them.
The inspector general determined that the department had no common definition of UTS and was not well-coordinated on the issue. Few components had taken action to mitigate the threat, and UTS-specific training was lacking. The audit warned that these deficiencies place the department and its people at heightened risk. The conclusion, according to the audit, should concern every Homeland Security and law enforcement official.
The threat extends beyond overseas posts. In October 2025, the Department of Homeland Security reported that cartels had placed bounties on Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection officers in Chicago. The reported figures were $2,000 for doxxing or gathering intelligence on agents and as much as $50,000 for killing high-ranking officials. For officers working cartel cases, the risk can follow them home.
A task-force officer who raids a cartel stash house in the morning may drive home that evening to the same community where the arrest occurred. The officer's children attend school there, the family goes to church there, and the officer coaches a youth sports team there on Saturdays. Individually, those pieces may appear insignificant. Combined, they can reconstruct a person's life and create a new vulnerability for federal law enforcement.
The commercial data economy does much of the work for adversaries. Duke University researchers bought sensitive records on U.S. military personnel for as little as 12 cents each, including names and home addresses. A separate investigation used commercial location data to trace devices associated with U.S. military sites in Germany to homes and schools for military children. The lesson is that adversaries no longer need to physically surveil their targets.
There are steps that could begin to address the problem. During the Global War on Terrorism, agencies became adept at using data to find people and map their networks. That expertise could be turned toward protecting personnel. Agents should have a program that checks what an adversary can already see about them. Agencies should help remove their addresses from broker sites where possible, help families lock down their accounts, and provide a clear way to report threats involving their names or personal information. Protection should be part of the job, with resources and accountability behind it.
The administration has designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, and DHS leadership has publicly described threats to its officers. Protecting the workforce from cartel surveillance follows from that, and it does not need to wait. One senior official should be put in charge. The effort should start with those at greatest risk: task forces working cartel cases, attachés overseas, and details protecting leaders. Agencies should find out what an adversary can see about them, use those findings to help families reduce exposure, and train agents to assume they are visible and work accordingly.
Congress should provide clear authority and sustained funding for that protection. The Mexico City case shows what can happen when surveillance exposes the people around an American official. Addresses, location histories, and family profiles can reveal the routines of an entire household, putting the people closest to that agent at risk. The audit's warning is that waiting for another tragedy is not an option.