Two numbers describe Russia’s position in the uranium market, and they measure different things. The first is straightforward: Russia mined 2,738 tonnes of uranium on its own territory in 2024, about 4.5% of global production. The second comes from the Centre for Strategic Advantage, which asks who controls or influences mining assets regardless of national borders. On that basis, the group says Russia’s effective reach was already close to one-quarter of global mining capacity.
That distinction is the core of a new warning about the nuclear fuel supply chain. CSA projects that Russian-controlled or influenced capacity could reach roughly 36% by 2040 if current agreements, projects under development and prospective mines proceed as assumed. The scenario should not be read as a guarantee. Mines can be delayed, governments can change licensing rules, partnerships can be restructured and financing can disappear. But the exercise shows why a country-of-origin table can understate geopolitical concentration.
Kazakhstan provides the clearest example. It was the world’s largest uranium producer in 2024, supplying 23,270 tonnes, or about 39% of the global total. Uranium One, owned by Rosatom, participates in several large Kazakh mines through joint ventures with the state producer Kazatomprom. World Nuclear Association data attribute 5,829 tonnes of foreign production to Uranium One in 2024. The uranium is Kazakh by geography, while part of the corporate influence over those operations is Russian.
The same logic is being tested in Africa, although the projects are at very different stages. In Tanzania, Uranium One’s Mkuju River project remains in development; a pilot processing facility began operating in July 2025, but the site is not yet a commercial mine. In Namibia, Uranium One is exploring the Aranos Basin for deposits suitable for in-situ recovery. In Niger, the company signed a memorandum with state-owned TNUC in December 2025 for permits, exploration and possible future mining. Describing all three countries as current producing operations would overstate what exists today.
Western governments are already trying to reduce dependence further down the fuel cycle. The European Union’s REPowerEU roadmap includes a gradual move away from Russian nuclear-energy inputs, while the United States has barred most imports of Russian low-enriched uranium since August 2024. Yet conversion and enrichment are only two links between a mine and a reactor. Utilities also need stable access to mined uranium, and the supply base is unusually concentrated: Kazakhstan and Canada alone accounted for well over half of global production in 2024.
This is why CSA compares the uranium issue with Europe’s past reliance on Russian oil and gas. The analogy is not exact. Uranium is stockpiled more easily, reactors consume far smaller volumes of fuel than gas-fired economies consume gas, and the nuclear fuel chain includes multiple processing stages. Still, concentrated ownership and long project lead times can make diversification slow even when governments decide it is urgent.
The useful way to read the 36% figure is therefore as a stress test. It identifies a path by which control could become more concentrated if existing relationships continue, not a fixed destination. New mines, changes in Kazakh partnerships, alternative investment in Africa and stronger Western fuel-cycle capacity could push the eventual share much lower. The next decade will determine which version of the market takes shape, because ownership and financing choices made now can lock in supply relationships for years.