The most important number in the uranium market may no longer be the amount mined inside Russia. It may be the amount produced by assets over which Russian state companies have influence abroad. The Centre for Strategic Advantage has reframed the market in those terms and concludes that Russia’s effective position could rise to about 36% of global uranium mining capacity by 2040.
On a conventional production table, the starting point looks far smaller. Russia mined 2,738 tonnes in 2024, roughly 4.5% of world production. The picture changes when ownership is added. Rosatom’s Uranium One has major interests in Kazakhstan, which supplied 23,270 tonnes of uranium in 2024 and remained by far the world’s biggest producer. Uranium One’s foreign production reached 5,829 tonnes, according to World Nuclear Association data, much of it tied to Kazakh joint ventures.
For executives and policymakers, that distinction is more than an accounting exercise. Nuclear fuel is a chain of long-lived assets and long-term relationships. A mine financed today can supply reactors for decades. Conversion and enrichment plants require large capital commitments. Utilities secure material years ahead. When control accumulates gradually through equity stakes, joint ventures and development agreements, the strategic effect can become visible only after alternative projects have lost time.
The African part of the Russian pipeline illustrates both the opportunity and the uncertainty. In Tanzania, Uranium One is developing Mkuju River and launched a pilot processing facility in July 2025, but commercial mining has not begun. In Namibia, work in the Aranos Basin remains geological exploration. In Niger, a December 2025 memorandum between Uranium One and state uranium company TNUC envisages permits, exploration and possible future mines. Those are options on future supply, not proof of present-day production.
Western governments are already paying to reduce exposure elsewhere in the chain. The United States banned most imports of Russian low-enriched uranium in August 2024 and is backing domestic enrichment and conversion with roughly $2.7 billion. The European Union has placed nuclear inputs inside its REPowerEU diversification agenda. But both policies face a time problem: new capacity takes years to build, while existing Russian-linked assets and contracts continue to operate.
That is why CSA’s 36% scenario is useful even if it never materializes. It forces decision-makers to think in portfolios rather than headlines. A country can reduce imports from Russia while remaining exposed to a mine in Kazakhstan whose ownership includes a Russian state company. A utility can switch enrichment providers yet still depend on a concentrated set of upstream suppliers.
The countercase is equally important. Legal changes, new investors, different Kazakh arrangements or faster mine development outside the Russian sphere could push the future share substantially lower. The strategic question is whether governments and companies will create those alternatives before scarcity forces them to. Uranium is relatively cheap compared with the value of the electricity produced from it, but secure supply is essential. That makes mine ownership, once a specialist concern, part of the broader leadership agenda around energy security.