The global uranium map looks different when it is drawn by ownership rather than borders. Russia itself produced only 2,738 tonnes of uranium in 2024, around 4.5% of the world total. Yet the Centre for Strategic Advantage argues that Moscow’s influence over mines abroad already puts its effective position close to one-quarter of global capacity and could lift that share to roughly 36% by 2040.
The route runs first through Kazakhstan. The country produced 23,270 tonnes in 2024, almost two-fifths of global supply. Uranium One, the Rosatom-owned mining company, participates in several large Kazakh ventures with Kazatomprom. Its foreign production was 5,829 tonnes in 2024. In ordinary trade statistics, that material belongs to Kazakhstan. In a strategic control map, the Russian state has a stake in the companies that bring some of it to market.
That distinction matters because uranium supply chains are built through long-lived partnerships. Ownership can shape investment decisions, production schedules, offtake arrangements and access to future capacity. None of those powers is identical to sovereignty over the host country, but together they can create leverage that national production statistics do not show.
Russia is also building options further south. In Tanzania, Uranium One is developing the Mkuju River project, where a pilot processing facility began operating in July 2025. Commercial mining has not yet started. In Namibia, the company is exploring the Aranos Basin for deposits suitable for in-situ recovery. In Niger, Uranium One signed a memorandum with state uranium company TNUC in December 2025 covering permits, exploration and possible future mines. That document opens a route into the sector but does not amount to present control of Niger’s production.
CSA’s 2040 scenario links those options with existing and committed assets. It assumes that projects progress and reach anticipated capacity. That is a meaningful stress case, not an inevitable outcome. Host governments can alter mining codes, joint ventures can be renegotiated, financing can shift and competing investors can build new mines. Different legal and market assumptions could leave Russian influence far below the 36% headline figure.
The West’s response so far has concentrated on another part of the network. The United States has banned most Russian low-enriched uranium imports since August 2024 and is financing domestic conversion and enrichment. The European Union is pursuing a gradual reduction of Russian nuclear inputs under REPowerEU. Yet both approaches must still connect to mined uranium. If upstream ownership becomes more concentrated while midstream processing diversifies, the strategic dependency is altered rather than eliminated.
This is why the uranium story is ultimately about routes of control. The raw material may cross one border, be converted in another country, enriched in a third and fabricated into fuel in a fourth. The political flag at the mine mouth tells only part of the story. Over the next decade, the decisive contest will be over who finances new deposits, who owns the joint ventures and who locks in long-term access before expected growth in nuclear demand tightens competition for supply.